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Jackson v. Virginia:1 Reopening the
Pandora's Box of the Legal
Sufficiency of Drug Identification
Evidence
By Edward J. Imwinkelried*
"We take judicial notice of the frightening rise of illicit drug
use... in this country which is rapidly approaching epidemic
proportions. However, we cannot allow this fact to result in a
lessening of the state's requirements of proving each element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, for this requirement
has long been a metaphysical cornerstone of our criminal
law. "-2
"The kilos have a law of their own." 3
Some observers of the American scene contend that no so-
ciety in history has been as drug conscious as ours. 4 The wide-
spread abuse of illicit drugs in the United States has had a
pervasive impact on our society and an especially marked effect
on our criminal justice system. Drug cases represent a large part
of the workload of courts, prosecutors, and public defenders, 5
and the scientific analysis of suspected contraband drugs consti-
tutes more than one-half of the caseload of many American
crime laboratories. 6
When a drug case comes to trial, testimony about the sci-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. B.A. 1967, J.D. 1969, Univ.
of San Francisco.
- 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
2 Slettvet v. State, 280 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind. 1972).
' Statement of Albert Kreiger, Past President, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.
I See A. MoEssENs & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 6.01,
at 283 (2d ed. 1978).
1 See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG ABUSE
IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTVE (1973).
6 J. PETERSON, FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE POLICE: TnE EFFECTS OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 174 (1983). See also Peterson, Mihajlovic &
Bedrosian, The Capabilities, Uses and Effects of the Nation's Criminalistics Laborato-
ries, 30 J. FoRENsIC ScI. 10, 15 (1985).
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entific analysis of the suspected drug seized from the defendant
is frequently the pivotal item of evidence. 7 One of the prosecu-
tor's principal problems of proof is establishing the identity of
the suspected drug.8 The Supreme Court has decreed that the
prosecution must prove every element of a charged offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 9 In a drug prosecution, the identity of
the substance in the defendant's possession is an element of the
offense 0 and must, consequently, be established by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt."
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, many scientists openly
criticized the quality of the evidence that prosecutors relied on
to establish the identity of suspected drugs. 2 These scientists
noted that almost all drug identification tests employed by police
crime laboratories were nonspecific; that is, the test could yield
a "positive" result with other substances as well as with the
suspected drug. 3 For example, both cocaine and baking soda
might turn blue when mixed with the same chemicals in a given
drug identification test. The color blue could be interpreted as
a positive result for cocaine under this test. However, if the
substance being tested is baking soda, the result is a false positive
error. 4 Simply stated, reliance by the trier of fact on the test
might lead to a miscarriage of justice. The trier might convict
even though the substance seized from the defendant was not
the illicit drug specified in the indictment or information.
7 See I D. BERNHEIm, DEFENSE OF NARcoTics CASES § 4.01, at 4-2 to 4-4 (1983).
1 See G. UELMEN & V. HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 4.1,
at 4-1 to 4-2 (1983).
1 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
tO 1 D. BERNiims , supra note 7, at 4-2 to 4-4.
" Id.; G. UELMEN & V. HADDOX, supra note 8, at 4-1-2; Bleser & Imwinkelried,
Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCIMS), TBE CHAmPION, Nov. 1983, at 6.
12 The leading article is Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, An Evaluation of Drug Testing
Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 727 [hereinafter cited as Stein & Laessig], reprinted in SCmNTIFIc
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, at 433 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 2d ed. 1981).
'1 See Fullerton & Kurzman, The Chemistry and Botany of Marijuana-an Update,
2 NAT'L J. CIam. DEF. 145 (1976); Shapiro, Chemical Defenses in Drug Cases, 2 NAT'L
J. CRsi,. DEF. 131, 132-33 (1976). See also W. CURTs, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR
AToRNEYs 123 (1983) for a discussion of hypothesis testing in general.
14 See Fullerton & Kurzman, supra note 13, at 145; Shapiro, supra note 13, at
132-33.
[Vol. 73
DRUG IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
The scientific community's critique of the prosecution's drug
identification evidence emboldened the defense bar to attack that
evidence in the courtroom.15 The mid-1970's witnessed the advent
of the so-called chemical defense in drug prosecutions. 6 This
defense opened a veritable Pandora's box of issues for the
courts. For example, defense counsel often argued that the pros-
ecution's identification evidence failed to sustain the govern-
ment's initial burden of going forward. 7 These arguments tended
to take different forms for various drugs.
For marijuana cases, defense counsel fashioned the species
defense.' 8 In urging this defense, counsel would first point out
that the relevant statute criminalizing marijuana explicitly banned
only Cannabis sativa. Counsel then presented expert taxonomic
testimony that there are at least three different species of Can-
nabis-sativa, indica, and ruderalis. Lastly, counsel would offer
expert chemical testimony that the prosecution's drug identifi-
cation tests were insufficiently specific to differentiate among
the three species. 9
Defense counsel in cocaine prosecutions developed a similar
argument-the isomer defense.20 Under this argument, counsel
would contend that the statute criminalizing cocaine applied to
only one cocaine isomer, L-cocaine, and that only a polarimeter
test was specific enough to distinguish L-cocaine from another
cocaine isomer, D-cocaine. 2'
The chemical defense and its variations met with only limited
success. 22 By and large, the courts rebuffed these defenses. 3 Most
1, See note 14 supra.
16 See id.
11 See Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 717 (1977). See also notes 107-22 infra and accom-
panying text.
" See United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See id. at 204.
z' See United States v. Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977). The two isomers
of cocaine rotate light passed through them in different directions. L-cocaine rotates the
light to the left (counterclockwise) while D-cocaine rotates the light to the right (clock-
wise). Id. at 1195 n.2.
21 See id. at 1195-96. See also United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980).
2 G. UELMEN & V. HADDOX, supra note 8, § 4.6, at 4-31 (citing United States v.
Lewallen, 385 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Collier, 14 CraM. L.
RaP. (BNA) 250 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1974); United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Sedan,
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courts upheld the legal sufficiency of conclusory prosecution
drug identification evidence even when the trial record neither
specified the drug identification tests used 24 nor clearly demon-
strated that the prosecution's drug identification tests were suf-
ficiently specific.2 5 The courts employed several theories to
undercut the species and isomer defenses. In some instances, the
courts rejected the defense counsel's proposed construction of
the statute criminalizing the drug.26 For example, numerous courts
held that marijuana statutes mentioning only Cannabis sativa
applied to all species of Cannabis. 27 In other instances, assuming
arguendo the defense counsel's proposed strict statutory con-
struction, the courts nevertheless found that the nonspecific tests
were adequate to satisfy the prosecution's burden of going for-
ward. 28 By the late 1970's, the chemical defense appeared to be
a dead issue.29 Seemingly, the courts had shut the lid on Pan-
dora's box.
In the mid-1980's, however, the courts may be forced to
rethink the issue of the legal sufficiency of prosecution drug
identification evidence. Two developments-one scientific and
the other legal-may reopen Pandora's box.
The scientific development is the emergence of a new gen-
eration of drug identification tests. The new tests are
14 Cams. L. RP. (BNA) 2387 (S.D. Fla. 1974)). The authors assert that the cited
decisions are "the only reported cases recognizing the species defense." Id.
2 See notes 112-25 infra and accompanying text.
24 See note 123 infra and accompanying text.
2 See notes 124-25 infra and accompanying text.
26 "[E]very federal circuit with the exception of the Seventh" and "most state
courts" rejected the species defense. G. UELMEN & V. HADDOX, supra note 8, § 4.6, at
4-31. See, e.g., Berg v. State, 216 N.W.2d 521 (Wis. 1974).
27 See 17 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2503, which refers to the "great majority of
jurisdictions" rejecting the species defense. See also Winters v. State, 646 P.2d 867, 871
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
1, See notes 120-25 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Fran-
cesco, 725 F.2d 817, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1984).
9 See Annot., supra note 17, at 721 ("With few exceptions, courts have declined
to reverse convictions for marijuana violations on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence as to the identification of the substance ... ."). See also notes 117-25 infra
and accompanying text.
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immunoassays 30-notably radioimmunoassay (RIA)3 1 and en-
zyme multiplied immunoassay technique (EMIT).32 Like most of
" See R. HAwKs, THm ANALYSiS OF CASABnNOIDS iN BIOLOGICAL FLUIDS (1983);
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 399-400 (I. Sunshine, ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as METHODOLOGY].
The immunoassay technique is explained:
Immunoassay of drugs is based on classical immunochemical proce-
dures and utilizes an antigen-antibody reaction as an analytical tool. An
antigen is any substance capable of eliciting an immune response when
injected into a host animal .... Antibodies are immunoglobins that are
formed in an animal as part of its immune response to an antigenic
stimulus. The antibodies thus formed have a highly specific ability to react
with the antigen that stimulated their formation. Thus, these can serve as
detectors for the drug in the antigen in a suitable analytical system.
The first step in the production of drug-specific antibodies is the
coupling of the drug to a suitable carrier protein.
Having synthesized and purified the antigen, the antibody is formed
by injecting a mixture of the antigen and Freund's adjuvant (a suitable
carrier vehicle) into an animal....
All immunoassays are based on a similar principle-the competitive
displacement of the labeled drug from the antibody complex by unlabeled
drug in the sample. The concentration of the drug in the sample can then
be determined by measuring the amount of the displaced labeled drug or
alternately, by measuring the amount of labeled drug still bound to the
antibody. In some immunoassays this involves a separation of the free and
bound drug forms .... In other procedures, this separation is not re-
quired....
Id.
3 The RIA technique is explained in METHODOLOGY, supra note 30:
Another immunoassay, which has become popular and has been ap-
plied to many different substances (rather than only drugs of abuse) is
radioimmunoassay (RIA). In this technique the antigen is labeled with a
suitable radioactive isotope. Many can be used, but most frequently the
isotope is either I', H1, or C 4. The usual antigen-antibody reaction is
performed, and either the bound or the displaced radioactive drug in the
resulting mixture is separated and measured. Usually the latter is involved,
and the measuring device used depends on the label. Products of I'2 are
measured in a gamma counter, while the H3 compounds require a scintil-
lation counter....
Id. at 402.
, EMIT is described as follows:
The Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) uses the
enzyme lysozyme as the label attached to the drug in question. This enzyme
catalyzes the hydrolysis of the mucopolysaccharide component of the cell
walls of certain bacteria. When the antibody binds the drug attached to
the enzyme, the enzyme is rendered inactive. In the presence of drug in
the sample the enzyme is released; the hydrolysis takes place and can be
measured. There is no need to separate the components of the reaction
1984-85]
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the earlier drug identification techniques, immunoassay tests are
nonspecific. 33 However, these new tests offer several practical
advantages over the older, more conventional tests. For example,
they are less expensive and more portable than many of the
older tests.34
The immunoassay industry has grown rapidly since 1980.35
Syva Company of California, Hoffman LaRoche of New Jersey,
Collaborative Research, Inc. of Massachusetts, and Guildhay
Antisera of England are marketing their immunoassay products
throughout the United States.36 The armed services now use
immunoassays in their urinalysis testing to identify drug abusers
and, in 1983, conducted more than two million immunoassay
tests. 37 The immunoassay technique is in widespread use in ci-
vilian police laboratories in California, Florida, Massachusetts,
Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. 3s The use of the new
immunoassay technique is extensive and rapidly growing. 39
because a negative sample will not displace the enzyme label; hence, no
activity will ensue. If the drug in question is present in the sample, the
enzyme is released and its activity, and hence the drug concentration, can
be determined by measuring the rate of clearing of the suspension of the
cell walls (the decrease in absorbance) as the enzyme hydrolyzes them into
small soluble pieces ...
Id. at 400.
13 Id. at 404. The author asserts that the "greatest defect" of immunoassays is
the lack of specificity. Id. The author adds that "there is great need to confirm all
positive results by some other procedure if specificity is important." Id. Syva Company's
latest advertisement for its EMIT immunoassays states that they are "class specific."
Syva Company, URm ASSAYS FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 1 (1983) (available from Syva Co.,
P.O. Box 10058, Palo Alto, CA 94303-0847). The advertisement contains a chart, listing
the drugs that some of its assays will detect. See id. at 2. For example, the chart indicates
that Syva's barbiturate assay is cross-reactive with amobarbital, butabarbital, and seco-
barbital. See id.
-, See Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, DRUG L. REP. 25 (May-June 1983).
35 Id.
36 R. Hawks, The Metabolism, Pharmocokinetics and Analysis of Marijuana Com-
ponents in Body Fluids: Implications for Non-Research Uses 3 (unpublished paper by
member of the Division of Research, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Rockville,
Maryland).
3, Zeese, supra note 34, at 25.
31 The author determined this through recent correspondence with the laboratories.
19 See McBay, Marihuana Testing: Litigation, in PROGRAM, 37H ANrMAL MEET-
ING, AMERICAN AcADEmy OF FoRnNsic SCmNTisTs 69-70 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
PROGRAM]; Smith, Detection of Amphetamine in Bloodstains, Semen, Seminal Stains,
Saliva, and Saliva Stains, 17 FORENSIC Sci. 225, 227 (1981). See also Comment, Admis-
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Immunoassay evidence is just beginning to surface in the
reported cases. 40 The emergence of this new, nonspecific drug
testing technique will give courts the opportunity to revisit the
issue of the legal sufficiency of prosecution drug identification
evidence. Moreover, a second legal development may compel the
courts to do so. That development is a 1979 Supreme Court
decision, Jackson v. Virginia.41 Prior to Jackson, many courts
applied a lax test in evaluating the sufficiency of prosecution
evidence to satisfy the due process clause. Some courts went so
far as to announce that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient
so long as the record included some probative evidence of the
existence of each element of the offense. 42 Other jurisdictions
were willing to sustain the prosecution's evidence if that evidence
created a mere permissive inference of the existence of each
element.43 In Jackson, the Court repudiated both of these stand-
ards and announced a more demanding test: The prosecution's
evidence must have sufficient cumulative probative value to per-
suade a Tational trier of fact of the existence of each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 44 The Court incorporated
the ultimate standard of proof ordinarily employed by the jury
during its deliberations-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-into
the test the judge uses in determining whether the prosecution
has met its initial burden of going forward. 45
This Article takes the position that given Jackson, courts
should no longer uphold the legal sufficiency of the conclusory
sibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results For the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana
Use, 20 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 391, 391-92 (1984).
4 See, e.g., Kane v. Fair, 33 C im. L. REP. (BNA) 2492 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1983);
State v. McDougall, 301 S.E.2d 308, 314 (N.C.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983);
Isaaks v. State, 646 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Urinalysis Update, DRUG L. REP.
72 (Nov.-Dec. 1983); Zeese, supra note 34, at 29.
41 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
42 See notes 137-46 infra and accompanying text.
,' See notes 160-73 infra and accompanying text.
" 443 U.S. at 318-20.
41 For a discussion of the differences between the ultimate burden of proof (the
standard used by the jury to evaluate the factual sufficiency of the evidence) and the
initial burden of going forward (the standard employed by the judge to assess the legal
sufficiency of the evidence), see E. PIm-nXEURUED, P. GiANNELL, F. GILGAN & F.
LEDERER, CRnNAL EVIDENCE 378, 384 (1979) [hereinafter cited as E. IMWRXELRIMD &
P. GiAwELLi].
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drug identification evidence that they have repeatedly accepted
in the past. The thesis of this Article is that such evidence is
legally insufficient under Jackson, at least when the defense
establishes through judicial notice that all the drug identification
tests employed by the prosecution are nonspecific. The first two
sections of this Article provide an historical perspective for the
thesis, by initially reviewing the criticisms that the scientific
community mounted against prosecution drug identification evi-
dence in the early 1970's, and then describing the courts' whole-
sale rejection of chemical defenses in the mid- and late 1970's.
The third section of the Article analyzes the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion in Jackson. The Article concludes by arguing
that conclusory prosecution drug identification evidence runs
afoul of Jackson, when the defense establishes through judicial
notice that all the prosecution's tests are nonspecific.
I. EARLY ATTACKS ON THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF
PROSECUTION DRUG IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
In the early 1960's, the use of illicit drugs in the United
States increased dramatically, and the number of drug prosecu-
tions skyrocketed. 46 Crime laboratories responded to this crisis
by furnishing the scientific drug identification evidence that pros-
ecutors needed to obtain convictions. During the 1960's, defense
counsel rarely challenged the sufficiency of drug identification
evidence. 47 Defense counsel not only did not object to the ad-
mission of the evidence, but also, in many cases, stipulated to
the admission of the evidence or to the identity of the substance
as a contraband drug. 4
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, numerous scientists raised
questions about the caliber of the drug identification evidence
customarily offered by prosecutors. 49
46 See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
4 See E. IMWINKELRIED, Tia METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 497
(1982). See also 1 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 5 (Winter 1978).
41 After the revelations of the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program, John
Ackerman, then Dean of the National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public
Defenders, cautioned defense counsel against stipulating so readily. I TRIAL DIPLOMACY
J., supra note 47, at 5.
11 See, e.g., Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 727.
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Because most of the tests used by the crime laboratories were
nonspecific, these scientists were skeptical of the quality of the
evidence.50 The scientists underscored the potential for miscar-
riage of justice created by the use of nonspecific tests: Whenever
a laboratory utilizes a nonspecific test, it is at least theoretically
possible that the test result will be a false positive.-1 Pointing to
hard evidence that crime laboratories were in fact misidentifying
suspected drugs, the scientists argued that the risk was more
than theoretical.5 2
A. The Potential for Misidentification of Drugs: The
Nonspecificity of the More Common Drug Identification Tests
Initially, scientists could only theorize that misidentifications
might be occurring. However, the theory had a sound basis in
the demonstrated nonspecificity of most of the drug identifica-
tion tests used by police laboratories.5 3 A test is said to be
specific for a particular drug if the test yields a positive result
for only that drug.54 A nonspecific test would produce the same
result for several compounds.
Even the harshest critics of prosecution drug identification
evidence willingly conceded that some of the available drug
identification tests were specific.5 5 Gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry (GC/MS)56 and infrared analysis (IR)17 are cases in
point. In a GC/MS test, the analyst first uses a gas chromato-
graph to separate the unknown compound into its components.5 8
As the components elute from the chromatograph, they are fed
directly into the mass spectrometer.5 9 The spectrometer bom-
Id. at 765.
" See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 131-43; Kurzman, Fullerton & McGuire, Winning
Strategies for Defense of Marijuana Cases: Chemical and Botanical Issues, I NAT'L J.
CRrM. DEF. 487 (1975).
52 See notes 99-110 infra and accompanying text.
" See Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 785.
14 See id. at 765-66.
11 See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 137-38; Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 737,
756-57, 762.
16 See Bleser & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 6.
17 See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 137-38; Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 762.
S See Bleser & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
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bards the components with an electron beam, fragmenting the
compound. 60 Each compound has a unique fragmentation pat-
tern.61 Hence, the test is specific.62 Similarly, infrared spectro-
photometry tests can be strong evidence of a suspected drug's
identity. 63 In an IR test, the analyst directs thermal energy at
the sample being analyzed. 64 The elemental composition of the
sample determines the wavelength of the energy that the sample
absorbs. 65 A chart or spectrum indicates the wavelength of the
absorbed energy and constitutes a "fingerprint" of many drugs. 66
While recognizing that the specific tests existed, the critics
also noted that crime laboratories raiely resorted to such tests. 67
Specific tests often required expensive instrumentation which
some laboratories could not afford. 68 Specific tests also necessi-
tated more highly trained technicians. 69 Even when the necessary
equipment was affordable or available, in some cases there was
no one on the crime laboratory staff with sufficient qualifica-
tions to conduct and interpret the test.70 Thus, by default, the
laboratories often relied on tests that were demonstrably non-
specific .7
The critics of prosecution drug identification evidence mar-
shalled impressive statistics to highlight the wide margin of error
of the nonspecific tests. A few statistics will illustrate.
One type of nonspecific drug identification procedure fre-
quently utilized in the early 1970's was the chemical color test.72
The color test rests on the assumption that the chemical reaction
between two compounds will produce a characteristic color. The
Id. at 9.
6, Id. at 9-10.
62 See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 137-38; Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 762.
63 Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 756-57.
6" See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 137.
63 Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 756-57.
6 Shapiro, supra note 13, at 137.
6 See Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 785-86.
61 Id. at 762.
69 Id. at 739.
70 Id. (failure to use a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer, another relatively
specific instrument).
11 See id. at 765-66, 784-85.
'2 See id. at 741-47.
[Vol. 73
DRUG IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
analyst mixes the unknown substance with the known reagent73
and observes the reaction.74 For example, when exposed to Mar-
quis' reagent, opium creates a red-violet color.7 However, other
drugs will also yield the same color when exposed to Marquis'
reagent.7 6 There are more than two million known organic com-
pounds. 77
If we assume that there are 20 distinguislable colors, then
there are 8,000 possible responses in three color tests and
160,000 possible responses in four color tests. Statistically, 250
different compounds (out of 2,000,000) would give the same
three color tests, and 12 would give the same four color tests.7
Color tests are often used as field screening procedures. 79
When an agent seizes a suspected drug from a detainee, the
agent conducts a color test to determine whether there is prob-
able cause to believe that the substance is a contraband drug. 0
If the test result is positive, the agent usually arrests the detainee
and forwards the substance to a crime laboratory for further
analysis."' In some crime laboratories, twenty to thirty percent
of the positive field color tests turn out to be false positives.8 2
Another nonspecific procedure in widespread use in the early
1970's was the thin layer chromatograph test (TLC).83 In this
procedure, a small quantity of the suspected drug is placed or
71 A reagent is defined as "something added to a solution to participate in a
chemical reaction." T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1073 (5th ed. 1982).
1, Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 741-47. See also Stall, Unreliability of Field
Tests as Means of Identifying Controlled Substances, 14 TIE ADVOCATE 398 (1982).
" A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 4, § 6.24, at 325.
76 Id. See also Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (positive
Marquis reagent test "merely evidence" that substance was an opiate derivative; test
does not prove substance is heroin).
R. SHARio & J. ACKERmAN, A GUIE TO THE ANALYTICAL MANUAL 5 (1975).
The analytical manual referred to in the title of the Guide was published by the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, now the Drug Enforcement Agency. The manual
describes drug identification techniques to be used in federal crime laboratories.
1, Shapiro, supra note 13, at 132-33 n.l.
79 See Stall, supra note 74, at 398.
See id.
sI Id. at 399.
" Id. at 401.
" Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 733-35.
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spotted on the bottom of a plate.84 The plate is then immersed
in a solution.85 The substance tends to migrate up the plate.
After the passage of a certain period of time, the plate is
removed from the solution and sprayed with a coloring agent. s6
The spray visualizes a streak on the plate. 87 The color and length
of the streak indicate the identity of the substance. 8 The length
of the streak is usually termed the RF value of the substance.8 9
Like a color test, a TLC test is nonspecific:
The probability that two different substances (out of the do-
main of two million) will have the same RF in a single TLC
experiment is high, and such an experiment does not constitute
proof of identity. The typical TLC plate is about four inches
long, which means that statistically, assuming an even distri-
bution, 500,000 compounds will fall within one of the inches;
250,000 per 1/2 inch; 125,000 per 1/4 inch; 62,500 per 1/8
inch; 31,250 per 1/16 inch; 15,625 per 1/32 inch; and 7,812
per 1/64 inch. In other words, statistically, again assuming an
even distribution, 7,812 compounds could have the same RF
as amphetamine .... 90
Even some of the routinely used instrumental tests were
nonspecific. Ultraviolet spectrophotometry (UV) bears some re-
semblance to infrared spectrophotometry, in that both proce-
dures test the ability of the sample to absorb a type of energy.9'
However, it would be a grievous mistake to leap to the conclu-
sion that UV is as specific as IR. 92 On the contrary, UV analysis
is much less specific:
UV is not a device that is particularly useful for identification
purposes. The entire UV region is about 200 nm 93 wide, mean-
ing that there are only 200 possible absorption rates. If only
"I Id. at 747-49.
85 Id.
8 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 R. SHAPiRmO & J. ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 6.
91 See Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 737-38, 779.
9 See id.
11 An nm or nanometer is 10- meters. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 136.
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20% of the 2,000,000 known organic compounds will absorb
ultraviolet light, or 400,000 compounds, then statistically, as-
suming an even distribution, 2,000 compounds will absorb at
about 258 millimicrons, [the wavelength for] ampheta-
mine .... 94
Even running several nonspecific tests does not guarantee a
positive identification. As observed above, if a laboratory sub-
jected a suspected drug to four different color tests, eleven other
compounds could easily produce an identical set of results on
the tests. 95 In one case, although the laboratory conducted seven
different TLC tests, there were false positives.96 In another case,
in which the prosecution expert relied on both color tests and
crystal tests97 to identify heroin, research disclosed other sub-
stances capable of producing the same set of test results. 98
B. The Reality of Misidentification of Drugs: The Growing
Evidence of Misanalysis of Suspected Drugs by Police Crime
Laboratories
By compiling the above statistics, the scientific critics of
prosecution drug identification evidence established the possibil-
ity that crime laboratories were misanalyzing suspected drugs.
To make matters worse, there was soon solid evidence that crime
laboratories were in fact misidentifying unknown substances.
One small-scale research project in the mid-1970's studied
the proficiency of nine toxicology laboratories. 99 These research-
ers found "significant interlaboratory variation in the ability of
... forensic toxicologists to ... detect drugs."' l
In 1974, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
', R. SHAPrRo & J. AcKiRMAN, supra note 77, at 5. See also Shapiro, supra note
13, at 136.
91 See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
96 See Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 750.
- For a description of crystal tests, see 1 D. BERaHEIn, supra note 7, at § 4.02[2]-
[7].
' See Shapiro, Chemist in the Courtroom, 3 NAT'L J. Ciam. DEF. 235, 261 (1977).
91 Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-Laboratory Survey of Forensic Toxi-
cology Proficiency, 22 CLiN. CHEm. 843 (1976).
19 Niyogi, Toxicology, reprinted in ScraNTmc AND EXPERT EVoENcE, supra note
12, at 383.
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initiated an ambitious, large-scale study of crime laboratory drug
identification accuracy, the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Pro-
gram (Program).10' Between 235 and 240 crime laboratories par-
ticipated in the various tests. 0 2 The Program's Project Advisory
Committee submitted samples to the participating laboratories
for analysis. 103 The committee had previously determined the
data that a sound forensic analysis of the samples would gen-
erate, and the committee was able to evaluate the laboratories'
performance by comparing the laboratories' analyses with the
known data.104 In all, the Program included twenty-one different
tests, involving such diverse samples as blood, fibers, and glass. 105
Two tests involved drug samples.'0 On one test, 1.7% of the
laboratories submitted data that the committee deemed unac-
ceptable. 0 7 On the other drug test, 18.2% of the laboratories
reported unacceptable findings. 10 The unacceptable findings in-
cluded misidentifications (false positives),'09 and the committee
concluded that the laboratories' use of nonspecific tests was a
likely, contributing cause of the misidentifications." 0
II. MAJORITY VIEW UPHOLDING THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF
CONCLUSORY PROSECUTION DRUG IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
By the mid-1970's, the critics of prosecution drug identifi-
cation evidence had constructed a powerful scientific indictment
against the most commonly used drug identification tech-
,o Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - a Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 268-70
(1981-82). See also E. Imwinkelried, supra note 47, § 1-1, at 4-6.
102 Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Re-
ports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HAST. L.J. 621, 636 (1978-79).
103 Id.
'0 Id.
,01 See Evidence Tests Stump Labs, 7 Law Enforcement Assistance Admin. News-
letter 1 (Sept. 1978).
106 Imwinkelried, Introduction to SCINTIIC AND EXPERT EvIDENCE, supra note
12, at 4.
07 Id.
,os Id.
1o9 PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT AssIsTANCE ADMiN., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, 6-10, Test no. 6, at
4 (1976).
110 Id. at 3.
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niques."' Nevertheless, when the defense bar attempted to con-
vert the scientific critique into legal attacks on the sufficiency
of prosecution drug identification evidence, the courts normally
were hostile to the attacks.112
A. Case Law Analyzing the Legal Sufficiency of Drug
Identification Evidence
There were a few exceptions to the norm.'1 3 A handful of
courts embraced the species defense in marijuana cases." 4 A
somewhat larger number of courts accepted the isomer theory
in cocaine cases, and required that the prosecution prove the use
of at least a relatively specific test such as the polarimeter." 5
Likewise, a small number of jurisdictions exhibited a generally
skeptical attitude toward prosecution drug identification evidence
for other drugs." 6
Nevertheless, the courts ordinarily rejected defense attacks
on prosecution drug identification evidence. The overwhelming
majority of courts repudiated the species" 7 and isomer" 8 defen-
ses. In addition, the courts sustained convictions based on con-
clusory prosecution testimony including little or no scientific
proof of the specificity of the tests used."19
See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
: See Annot., supra note 17, at 721.
13 See id.
"' See cases quoted in G. UELMEN & V. HADDOX, supra note 8, § 4:6, at 4-31.
These cases are listed in note 22 supra.
" See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
939 (1980). See also People v. Aston, 36 Clui. L. REP. (BNA) 2298 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
116 See Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that a
Marquis reagent test identification of a substance as heroin is insufficient to satisfy even
the relaxed requirements of a probation revocation). See also Bueno v. State, 677 S.W.2d
261, 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Portrey, 492 P.2d 1050 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972)
(rejecting modification of VanUrk color change test as sole basis for identification of
substance as LSD).
"' See notes 26-27 supra.
"' See United States v. Hall, 552 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1977) (unnecessary to perform
polarimeter test); United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977) (mixed melting point test adequate for identification;
polarimeter test not required). See also United States v. Ortiz, 610 F.2d 280, 281-82 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980) ("comparative analysis" for each synthetic
isomer of cocaine not necessary).
,M See notes 120-25 infra and accompanying text.
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In sustaining these convictions, the courts seemed satisfied
with the prosecution analyst's testimony or assertion that the
tests identified the drug in question. 120 If the expert testified
"unequivocally' ' 2 1  or "clearly and unequivocally,' 2 courts
would accept the testimony at face value. Thus, the courts
appeared more concerned about the character of the testimony
than the specificity of the tests. The courts' indifference to the
problem of the tests' nonspecificity was manifest. Cases are
legion in which the courts sustained the prosecution evidence in
spite of the absence of any indication of the identity of the tests
the crime laboratory used.1 23 In a similar vein, courts upheld
convictions when all the tests used by the prosecution analyst
were nonspecific. 24 Courts even went so far as to affirm con-
victions in cases in which the prosecution cavalierly presented
evidence of only a single, nonspecific test. 12
In short, the attitude of most courts toward prosecution drug
identification evidence was remarkably uncritical. Courts seemed
perfectly willing to accept the analyst's ipse dixit; the court's
analysis ended with the analyst's assertion that the tests identified
the drug. Courts did not insist upon any truly scientific proof
of the drug's identification. The analyst was not required to cite
any scientific literature recognizing the test as a trustworthy
110 See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 511 P.2d 883, 884 (Colo. 1973) (expert testimony
identifying marijuana sufficient); State v. Keys, 328 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1976) (expert
testimony identifying substance as marijuana sufficient).
1 See, e.g., Valdez v. State, 117 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
" See, e.g., United States v. Burden, 497 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1974).
'1 See, e.g., United States v. Haro-Espinosa, 619 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1980); Stevens
v. State, 302 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. 1983); State v. Baca, 472 P.2d 651 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 472 P.2d 984 (N.M. 1970); A. MoENssENs & F. INBAu, supra note 4, at 340
n.89. The opinions often contain vague, unilluminating references to a "chemical anal-
ysis." See Barrett v. State, 329 N.E.2d 58, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Mosier,
490 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Garcia, 419 P.2d 121, 128 (Wash.
1966).
'24 See State v. Shelli, 675 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Carrizal v. State,
134 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939); State v. Montague, 438 P.2d 571, 577
(Wash. 1968); State v. Wind, 208 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. 1973).
12 See People v. Park, 380 N.E.2d 795 (Il1. 1978) (Duquesnois-Levine test); Cher-
nois, Tentative and Rigorous Proof in the Identification of Organic Compounds and
Application of these Concepts to the Detection of Active Principals of Marijuana, 4
MICROCHEM. J. 558 (1960) (Color tests are only "functional group tests .... [S]uch a
proof is merely tentative and not admissible as reliable evidence.").
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means of identifying the drug, and there was no necessity for
proof that the test or combination of tests was capable of
singling out the drug.
B. The Pre-Jackson v. Virginia Standards for Assessing the
Legal Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
At first blush, it may seem surprising that courts were so
tolerant of relatively feeble prosecution drug identification evi-
dence. After all, the scientific critics of such evidence had pre-
sented a persuasive case,' 26 and prosecution evidence does have
to pass muster under the rigorous standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 127 However, the courts' tolerance was under-
standable in light of the fact that, before Jackson v. Virginia,128
many courts employed a relaxed standard for judging the legal
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence. Although proof beyond
a reasonable doubt was universally employed as the measure of
the burden of persuasion in the United States, 129 that standard
was not the test for evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence. 130 As triers of fact, the jurors used the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard of proof to determine whether the
prosecution had met its ultimate burden of proof.' The jurors
resolve all questions of credibility and decide whether the pros-
ecution's case is factually sufficient to meet the final burden.
However, the judge decides whether the prosecution's evidence
is legally sufficient to meet its initial burden of going forward. 132
Prior to Jackson, there was a three-way split of authority as to
the proper standard for assessing the legal sufficiency of prose-
'2 See notes 54-110 supra and accompanying text.
,17 See, e.g., C. McCoRINCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341 (3d ed.
1984).
M~ 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
119 See E. IMWINncLaRaD & P. GiAN~NEi, supra note 45, at 386-87; C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 127, at § 341.
See E. Ih nmuthED & P. GtANNEtLi, supra note 45, at 387; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 127, at §§ 336, 338.
'" See E. IMwn;KELRmD & P. GANNELLI, supra note 45, at 386-87; C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 127, at § 341.
"3 See E. IMWINKELREED & P. GIANNELLI, supra note 45, at 387; C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 127, at §§ 336, 338.
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cution evidence: 3 3 the scintilla rule,134 the Curley view, 35 and
the substantial evidence doctrine. 136
Under the scintilla rule, the prosecution's case is legally
sufficient even if there is only a scintilla of relevant evidence on
each element of the charged offense. 37 Courts have used various
expressions to describe the rule: The motion for a directed
verdict must be denied if the record contains any 38 or some 39
relevant evidence; the motion must be denied if there is a
modicum 40 or scintilla 4' of evidence; the motion can be granted
only if the record is totally' 2 devoid' 3 of evidence and there is
no' 4 evidence of an essential element. Some commentators pro-
claim that the scintilla rule is a judicial legend and maintain that
no court ever took the rule seriously enough to uphold verdicts
resting on such scanty evidence. 45 However, it is clear that the
scintilla rule was the announced standard in several jurisdic-
tions.146
It was predictable that especially in criminal cases, many
courts would abandon the scintilla rule. 47 Even before Jackson
v. Virginia, numerous jurisdictions had overruled the scintilla
doctrine."'4 Some of these jurisdictions decided, as a matter of
" See Circuit Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1971-72 Term Criminal
Law and Procedure, 61 GEo. L.J. 275, 429-31 (1972-73).
134 See notes 137-46 infra and accompanying text.
"I See notes 147-58 infra and accompanying text.
136 See notes 158-73 infra and accompanying text.
137 C. McCoRMCK, supra note 127, at § 338.
131 See Comment, Criminal Procedure: Sufficiency of Evidence Now Reviewable in
Habeas Corpus Proceeding, 19 WAsHru.RN L.J. 616, 617 (1979-80).
"I See Comment, Federal Review of the Evidence Supporting State Convictions:
Jackson v. Virginia, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1577, 1577 (1979).
110 See Comment, supra note 138, at 621; Recent Developments, Criminal Law and
Procedure-Due Process-Evidentiary Review in Federal Habeas Corpus, 47 TENN. L.
Rav. 456, 467 n.49 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964)).
141 See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLus AT COMMON LAW § 2494, at 384
(Chadbourn Rev. 1981).
142 See Comment, supra note 139, at 1577.
' See Recent Decision, 10 CuM. L. REv. 849, 858 (1979-80).
144 See Comment, supra note 139, at 1579.
1' See F. JAMEs, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 7.11, at 272 (1965).
"1 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 127, § 338, at 952-53; 9 J. W\VMoRE, supra
note 141, § 2494, at 384. See also Hoffman, Alabama's Scintilla Rule, 28 ALA. L. REv.
592 (1977).
141 See 9 J. WIrMoRE, supra note 141, § 2494 n.15.
148 See id.
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policy, the standard for the initial burden in criminal cases
should be enhanced in the same fashion as the ultimate burden.
149
Judge Traynor wrote, "When it is the responsibility of the trier
of fact to observe the requirement of ... evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, as in criminal cases, it becomes the responsi-
bility of the appellate court to test the finding accordingly."' 50
He argued that in a criminal case, the judge should "do more
than determine simply whether the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the alleged fact was more probable than not.' 15'
A large number of jurisdictions, 152 state13 and federal, 54 fol-
lowed Traynor's reasoning. Courts in these jurisdictions man-
dated that in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial
judge must inquire whether a rational juror could find the ex-
istence of each element of the charged offense beyond a reason-
able doubt. 15 Under thig mandate, the prosecution fails to make
a submissible case if its evidence supports only a permissive
inference of the existence of all elements of the offense.5 6 This
view came to be known as the Curley 57 or humane' 58 doctrine.
While the Curley view had a wide following, 59 a large num-
ber of jurisdictions opted for a compromise position-the sub-
stantial evidence rule.' 60 These jurisdictions acknowledged that
the scintilla rule afforded the defendant inadequate protection.' 6'
- See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 467, at
655-58 (2d ed. 1982).
'.o R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HALMLESS ERROR 29 (1970).
"4 d.
152 See 2 C. WRIo, supra note 149, § 467, at 658-59 n.15.
"4 See, e.g., State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684 (Hawaii 1970). See also C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 127, § 338, at 953 n.5.
" See, e.g., Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1960); Curley v. United
States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947); 2 C. WRIGHT, supra
note 149, § 467, at 655-58.
" See, Comment, The Jackson v. Virginia Standard for Sufficiency of the Evi-
dence, 65 IowA L. REv. 799, 806 (1979-80).
156 See id.
117 The leading authority for this proposition is Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d
at 229.
is, See Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d at 954.
-' See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 149, § 467, at 655-58.
- See Circuit Note, supra note 133, at 431. See also People v. White, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 312, 316-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Houts, 150 Cal. Rptr. 589, 594-95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978); In re Richard T., 144 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
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Yet they refused to incorporate the test of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt into the standard for the initial burden of
going forward. 16 2 Advocating the substantial evidence rule, Judge
Learned Hand contended that the Curley view was judicially
unmanageable-"too thin for day to day use" and leading to
"unreal refinements."' 163 Following Hand's reasoning, many state
courts invoked "common sense" and asserted that the Curley
view rested on an unduly "subtle distinction."' 164 As a compro-
mise between the Curley view and the scintilla doctrine, the
substantial evidence rule requires only that the judge find the
prosecution evidence adequate 65 to fairly' 66 or rationally' 67 sup-
port a permissive6 8 inference 6 9 or conclusion. 70 If a rational
juror could find that the evidence preponderates 7' and that the
fact's existence is more likely or more probable than not, 72 the
prosecution has sustained its initial burden. In that event, the
judge should deny the motion for a directed verdict even when
the judge is convinced that the evidence would be insufficient to
convince a rational juror beyond a reasonable doubt. 73
Jurisdictions adhering to the substantial evidence doctrine
thought it not only preferable as a matter of policy but also
constitutionally adequate. Prior to Jackson v. Virginia, the con-
denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944). The Second Circuit overruled Feinberg in United States v.
Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1972).
"1 140 F.2d at 594.
163 Id.
16 See, e.g., State v. Nutley, 129 N.W.2d 155, 162 (Wis. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 918 (1965). But see State v. Stevens, 132 N.W.2d 502, 509 (Wis. 1965) ("Language
in Nutley which conveys the impression that any credible evidence is sufficient to sustain
a conviction on appeal is withdrawn.").
67 See Wilson v. Harris, 496 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
16 See Recent Developments, supra note 140, at 466.
167 See United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1266 (6th Cir. 1977).
161 See State v. Nutley, 129 N.W.2d at 163. But see note 164 supra.
169 129 N.W.2d at 163.
170 See United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 116-17 (6th Cir. 1979).
171 United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
882 (1956); United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d at 594. But see United States v. Taylor,
464 F.2d at 242 (overruling Feinberg).
172 235 F.2d at 286.
- See Hays v. United States, 231 F. 106, 108 (8th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 242 U.S. 470
(1917). The adherents to the substantial evidence test included such liberal jurisdictions
as California. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 160.
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trolling Supreme Court precedent was Thompson v. City of
Louisville,174 rendered in 1960. Thompson involved a direct ap-
peal from a state court conviction for disorderly conduct. 75
Noting the absence of evidence of disruptive behavior in the
trial record, the Court declared that it is "a violation of due
process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his
guilt.' ' 76 The Thompson doctrine became known as the "no
evidence" rule: The defense is entitled to a directed verdict only
if the record contains no evidence of an essential element of the
offense.177 On its face, the Thompson opinion seemed to sanction
the scintilla rule; and, in a line of cases applying Thompson, the
Supreme Court used language reminiscent of the scintilla rule:
"[T]otally devoid of evidence,' '1 78 any "relevant" evidence, 79
and "a mere modicum of evidence."'' s0
Despite this line of authority, there were inklings even before
Jackson v. Virginia that the Court would one day jettison the
"no evidence" standard. To begin with, the "no evidence" rule
was arguably a misreading of Thompson. 8' In Thompson, the
Court reversed the conviction when it found absolutely no evi-
dence of disorderly conduct. 82 The result would have been the
same had the Court applied the scintilla rule, the Curley test, or
the substantial evidence doctrine. 83 The lower courts were guilty
of fallacious reasoning when they embraced Thompson's con-
verse and treated the opinion as authority that a conviction must
be affirmed if there is any supporting evidence. 84 Furthermore,
Thompson antedated In re Winship,85 the 1970 decision in which
the Court first held that the due process clause requires the use
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the standard of proof in
,7 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
'" See id. at 205-06. See also Comment, supra note 138, at 617, 621, 623-24.
116 362 U.S. at 206.
'7 See Note, Jackson v. Virginia: The Advent of the Reasonable Doubt Standard
in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 25 S.D.L. REv. 372, 374-75 (1980).
178 Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973).
179 Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974).
" Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
19 See Note, supra note 177, at 374.
18 Id.
183 See id.
19 Id.
It' 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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criminal cases. Several lower courts viewed Winship as a death-
knell for Thompson.18 6 On occasion, the Supreme Court itself
seemed to assume that Winship had undermined Thompson. 87
This assumption was most clearly stated in Justice Stewart's
1977 dissent from a denial of certiorari in Freeman v. Zahrad-
nick. 188 There, Justice Stewart raised the question of whether the
"no evidence" doctrine had survived Winship, 8 9 setting the stage
for his 1979 opinion in Jackson. 90
III. THE NEW DEVELOPMENT CALLING THE MAJORITY VIEV
INTO QUESTION: Jackson v. Virginia
When Justice Stewart penned his Freeman dissent in 1977,
perhaps even he did not realize how imminent the demise of the
Thompson doctrine was. However, two short years later in Jack-
son v. Virginia,191 Justice Stewart, writing for a five-judge ma-
jority, authored the lead opinion overruling Thompson.
The Jackson case began in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield
County, Virginia. 192 Jackson was charged with the first-degree
murder of Mary Cole. The Virginia Code defines murder as "the
unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought."' 93 Under
Virginia law, the presence of premeditation or specific intent to
kill is the factor that distinguishes first-degree from second-
degree murder. 94
At the bench trial in Jackson's case, the existence of pre-
meditation was the central issue. 95 Jackson claimed that he had
been drinking before his encounter with Ms. Cole. 19 His theory
of defense was as follows: Ms. Cole made sexual advances
,"6 See, e.g., Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1214 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Spruytte v. Koehler, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978) (decision without
a published opinion).
' , See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 n.7 (1971).
,,' 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
,19 See id. at 1111-16. See also Recent Decision, supra note 143, at 850 n.10.
19o See Recent Decision, supra note 143, at 850 n.10.
191 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
2 Id. at 309.
,93 VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (1975), cited in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 309 n.l.
'9 443 U.S. at 309.
191 Id. at 309-11.
"1 Id. at 310.
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toward him; he rejected the advances; she then attacked him
with a knife; he attempted to defend himself with a nearby
revolver; and during the struggle, Ms. Cole was killed when the
revolver accidentally discharged.19 7 The prosecution contended
that Jackson was sober at the time .of the shooting and intro-
duced evidence that Jackson had been firing the revolver earlier
in the day. 198
The trial judge found Jackson guilty of first-degree murder
and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment. 99 Jackson filed a
motion in trial court to set aside the judgment on the ground
that the judgment was contrary to the evidence. 200 The trial judge
denied the motion, and Jackson next petitioned for a writ of
error to the Virginia Supreme Court. 201 When the court denied
the writ, Jackson sought relief in the federal system.
Jackson began a habeas corpus proceeding in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 20 2 Pur-
porting to apply the lax Thompson standard, the court found
that the record was devoid of evidence of premeditation and
granted Jackson relief.,23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court judgment. 20" The appellate court noted
Justice Stewart's 1977 dissent and expressed doubt as to whether
Thompson was still good law. 205 However, the court concluded
that absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the court
was obliged to apply Thompson.206 Canvassing the record, the
court found that the prosecution had presented some evidence
of Jackson's specific intent to kill and, consequently, denied
Jackson relief.20 7
' ' Id. at 310-11.
"' Id. at 310.
,9 Id, at 311.
Id.
2 Id.
Id. at 312.
10 Id. at 312. The district court's opinion is unreported. Id. at 312 n.6.
204 Id. at 312. The appellate court's opinion is also unreported. Id. at 312 n.6. The
Fourth Circuit's judgment order is reported at 580 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1978).
21 443 U.S. at 312.
2Id.
w7 Id.
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The Supreme Court granted Jackson's petition for certiorari2 3
to consider the question of the impact of Winship on Thomp-
son.20 9 Justice Stewart began his analysis by chronicling the
history of the Thompson doctrine2 0 and reviewing the progeny
of Winship.21' He conceded that the opinions appeared to speak
to different issues: Thompson addressed the standard the judge
uses in evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, while
Winship discussed the standard employed by the trier of fact in
judging the factual sufficiency of the evidence. 21 2 Thus, techni-
cally, the opinions were not at odds. Justice Stewart noted that
even in the post-Winship era,
the Federal Courts of Appeals have generally assumed that so
long as the reasonable-doubt instruction had been given at
trial, the no-evidence doctrine ... remains the appropriate
guide for a federal habeas corpus court to apply in assessing
a state prisoner's challenge to his conviction as founded upon
insufficient evidence.213
However, Stewart faulted the courts' assumption as reducing
Winship to a "ritual. ' 21 4 According to Stewart, the "central
purposes" to be served by Winship not only require that the
judge instruct the jury to use the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt during its deliberations but also demand that
the judge police the jury's administration of the standard. 21 5
Under this view, the judge has a constitutional responsibility to
ensure that the jury operates within the parameters established
by Winship.216 To discharge that responsibility, Stewart reasoned
that the judge must use a standard stricter than Thompson:
"The Thompson doctrine simply fails to supply a workable or
even a predictable standard for determining whether the due
Jackson v. Virginia, 439 U.S. 1001 (1978).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 313-14.
210 See id. at 314.
211 See id. at 315.
212 See id. at 314-15.
213 Id. at 316.
214 Id. at 317.
211 See id. at 317-20.
216 Id.
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process command of Winship has been honored. ' 21 7 In other
words, a stricter standard for evaluating the legal sufficiency of
the evidence is a necessary means of implementing Winship.
Justice Stewart closed his analysis of the relationship between
Thompson and Winship by proclaiming the Court's holding:
We hold that in a challenge to a state criminal conviction
brought under 28 U.S.C. section 2254 ... the applicant is
entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the
record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.218
Given Jackson's procedural setting, the scope of its holding
could conceivably be limited. For example, prosecutors could
urge that Jackson be confined to federal habeas corpus review
of state court convictions. So restricted, Jackson would neither
affect direct appeals from state courts to the United States
Supreme Court nor directly impose any duties on state trial
judges. However, the Court's rulings and rationale in Jackson
cut in favor of a more expansive interpretation of the opinion.
In the course of .his opinion, Justice Stewart specifically repu-
diates Thompson.2 9 Thompson was a direct appeal case rather
than a habeas corpus collateral attack.220 Hence, Jackson should
apply equally to direct and collateral attacks. Moreover, Justice
Stewart did not premise Jackson on a construction of the federal
habeas corpus statute. Rather, he rationalized the doctrine under
the due process clause2' which applies to both federal and state
courts.mn Thus, the Jackson standard should apply not only to
federal review of habeas corpus petitions but also to state trial
court rulings on motions for directed verdict and to state appel-
late court decisions on appeal.'
217 Id. at 320.
28 Id. at 324. See also Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 444 U.S. 1 (1979).
219 443 U.S. at 320.
_2 See Comment, supra note 138, at 617, 621, 623-24.
M See 443 U.S. at 320-24.
In See U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & XIV.
22 See Comment, supra note 138, at 623 n.83 (citing State v. Voiles, 601 P.2d 1121
(Kan. 1979) (Jackson applicable to direct appeal) and State v. Rodriguez, 601 P.2d 686
(Kan. 1979) (Jackson applicable to directed verdict motion)).
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The Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to clarify
the scope of Jackson.224 However, many commentators n2 and
lower courts favor a generous reading of the opinion. The courts
generally proceed on the assumption that Jackson applies directly
to the states226 and governs both appellate review227 and trial
court rulings on the legal sufficiency of the evidence.22 This
Article makes that assumption in the next section.
IV. THE UNSOUNDNESS OF THE MAJORITY VIEw IN THE LIGHT
OF Jackson v. Virginia
At this juncture, the impact of Jackson on drug prosecutions
is unsettled. Few courts have even realized that Jackson is per-
tinent to the question of the legal sufficiency of prosecution drug
identification evidence.229 Many courts continue to pass on the
legal sufficiency of such evidence without so much as a citation
to Jackson.210 It may be years before the courts clarify the fallout
from Jackson in drug cases. However, it is the thesis of this
Article that Jackson should have at least one effect in drug
cases: When the defense establishes through judicial notice that
all the prosecution's drug identification tests are nonspecific, the
prosecution's drug identification evidence is legally insufficient
The procedural setting in Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 (1979), was
identical to that in Jackson-a federal habeas corpus challenge to a state court convic-
tion. Jackson thus has yet to be tested by the Court in a direct appeal.
m See, e.g., Shellow & Theis, United States v. Bell and the Directed Verdict in
Criminal Cases: The Death of the Two-Hypothesis Rule, 35 MERCER L. REv. 1209,
1210-11 (1983-84); Comment, supra note 138, at 623.
216 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 601 P.2d at 691; State v. Voiles, 601 P.2d at 1124-
25; Taylor v. State, 684 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Wakefield,
682 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Mo. App. 1984); Watts v. State, 680 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); Williamson v. State, 679 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Garcia v.
State, 661 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Whaley v. State, 660 S.W.2d 894,
897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Michalenko v. State, 658 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983).
227 See, e.g., 601 P.2d at 1124-25; Colvin v. State, 472 A.2d 953 (Md.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 226 (1984); 661 S.W.2d at 99; 660 S.W.2d at 897; 658 S.W.2d at 763. See
also United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1985).
22 See, e.g., 601 P.2d at 691.
229 See, e.g., Chouinard v. State, 635 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 P.2d 680 (N.M. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930 (1982); State v.
Copeland, 677 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
See, e.g., United States v. Posey, 647 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).
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unless the prosecution presents proof of the substance's identity
in addition to the analyst's conclusory assertion that the tests
identify the substance. Since the scientific concept of specificity
and the nonspecific status of many drug identification tests are
judicially noticeable facts, these facts should be considered in
the judge's assessment of the legal sufficiency of the prosecu-
tion's drug identification evidence. When judicial notice estab-
lishes that all the prosecution's tests are nonspecific, an analyst's
conclusory identification is insufficient to satisfy Jackson.
A. The Definition of the Scientific Term "Specificity" and the
Nonspecific Status of Many Drug Identification Tests Are
Judicially Noticeable Facts.
The early common law of judicial notice recognized only one
basis for judicial notice: matter of common knowledge. 21 Under
that criterion, a judge would judicially notice a fact only if the
fact would in all probability be known by any reasonably intel-
ligent person residing within the court's geographical jurisdic-
tion.23 2 The judge could notice such facts as whether a particular
well-known intersection was located within the town's business
district. 2 3 If the fact was notorious and indisputable, the judge
could dispense with live testimony and simply instruct the jury
that the fact exists.2 4
Although matter of common knowledge was the traditional
basis for judicial notice, another independent basis emerged:
verifiable certainty.2 5 Even when a fact is not a matter of
common knowledge, it makes little sense to require the formal
introduction of evidence to prove the fact if it is "capable of
immediate... demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accuracy. 23 6 The Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) codify the modern common law by recognizing alternative
"3 E. IMWINKELRIED & R. GIANNELLI, supra note 45, at 394-95; C. McCoRMCK,
supra note 127, at § 329.
2 See note 231 supra.
"I See Varcoe v. Lee, 181 P. 223 (Cal. 1919).
2-' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 127, at §§ 328, 331.
"I E. IMWINKELRIED & R. GLANNELLI, supra note 45, at 395-97; C. McCopMICK,
supra note 127, at § 330.
mUNUi. R. Evn. 9(2)(d).
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bases for judicial notice: "A judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. ' 23 7 Under the
Federal Rules, as at common law, if the judge notices a prop-
osition as a matter of common knowledge or a verifiable cer-
tainty, the judge instructs the jury about the proposition. 238
Courts have frequently invoked the verifiable certainty theory
as the basis for judicially noticing scientific data. 239 Many com-
mentators have pointed out that noticing scientific principles is
one of the most common applications of the verifiable certainty
theory.24° Some evidence treatises include long lists, cataloging
various scientific propositions that the courts have noticed. 241 In
general, the courts have been receptive to requests for judicial
notice of scientific data when the proponent documents the facts
with standard, authoritative scientific texts.2 2
In particular, courts have been willing to judicially notice
definitions of scientific terms. 24 3 Under the matter of common
knowledge standard, courts were occasionally willing to notice
the generally accepted, generic definitions of common terms. 244
As the courts moved toward recognition of verifiable certainty
as an alternative ground for judicial notice, 245 they understand-
ably were more inclined to notice definitions. Technical diction-
237 FED. R. EvlD. 9(2)(d).
211 See FRE 201(g).
2' See Melong v. Micronesian Claims Comm'n, 643 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 427 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd
on other grounds, 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
240 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 127, at § 330; 1 F. WHARTON, WXHARToN's
CRumAL EVIDENCE § 71 (13th ed. 1972).
24, See, e.g., 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 240, at §§ 71-88.
242 C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 127, at § 330; 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 240, at §
71; E. IMWINKELRMD & R. GANNELLI, supra note 45, at 395-97.
241 See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 529 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1976) (the definition of
heroin hydrochloride).
244 E.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80; Nestle
Co. v. Chester's Market, 571 F. Supp. 763, 775 n.9 (D. Conn. 1983); 1 F. WHARTON,
supra note 240, at § 72.
241 See FRE 201. Twenty-eight states have now adopted a version of the Federal
Rules.
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aries abound, and the definition of a technical or scientific term
can easily be ascertained by consulting such a dictionary.
Many scientific articles dealing with drug identification evi-
dence explain the concept of specificity2 6 Leading technical
dictionaries such as Medical Dictionary for Lawyers247 and Sted-
man's Medical Dictionary248 contain similar definitions. It seems
patent that the definition of the term "specificity" is proper
subject-matter for judicial notice.
It is equally justifiable to judicially notice the nonspecific
status of many of the prosecution drug identification tests. In
the past, courts have noticed the principles underlying scientific
tests249 such as fingerprints, 250 firearms identification,25 ' gateflux
magnetometers,2 2 handwriting comparisons,2 5 3 intoxication de-
terminations,2 5 4 and radar.25 In the case of fingerprints 25 6 and
palmprints,2 7 courts have also noticed the fact that the tests are
specific. As one court remarked, it is judicially noticeable that
"no two sets of fingerprints or palmprints are exactly alike.' '258
By parity of reasoning, the courts should notice the nonspe-
cificity of such drug identification procedures as color tests and
thin layer chromatography. Section I of this Article detailed the
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 13; Stein & Laessig, supra note 12.
247 B. MALoY, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 415 (1942).
141 T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1308 (5th ed. 1982).
249 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 240, at § 81.
m See, e.g., Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
664 (1936); State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951); Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885
(Okla. Crim. App. 1930); Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941);
Annot., 28 A.L.R.2D 1115 (1953).
2'5 See, e.g., State v. Hackett, 55 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 1949).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2 See, e.g., Adams v. Ristine, 122 S.E. 126 (Va. 1924); Fenelon v. State, 217
N.W. 711 (Wis. 1928).
See, e.g., People v. Stringfield, 185 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1962); State v. Miller,
165 A.2d 829 (N.J. 1960); People v. Donaldson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957); State v.
Tomanelli, 216 A.2d 625 (Conn. 1966); Commonwealth v. Whynaught, 384 N.E.2d 1212
(Mass. 1979); State v. Dantonio, 115 A.2d 35 (N.J. 1955); People v. Magri, 147 N.E.2d
728 (N.Y. 1958).
2 See, e.g., State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976).
" See id.
M Id. at 588.
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evidence of the nonspecificity of such widely used drug identi-
fication procedures as color -tests,259 thin layer chromatogra-
phy,2 60 and ultraviolet spectrophotometry. 26 The proof of the
nonspecificity of these procedures is extensive and impressive.
Because the available proof satisfies the standard of practical
indisputability262 that the courts have fixed for judicial notice,
the nonspecific status of such tests should be judicially noticed.
B. Since the Definition of "Specificity" and the Nonspecific
Status of Many Drug Identification Tests Are Judicially
Noticeable, the Trial Judge Should Factor Those Propositions
into His or Her Analysis of the Legal Sufficiency of the
Prosecution's Drug Identification Evidence.
Where the defense establishes, through judicial notice, that
all the drug identification tests employed by the prosecution's
witnesses were nonspecific, the judge must determine whether
this information is relevant to a ruling on the legal sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence. The cases direct the judge to
consider the record in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion.263 More significantly, some cases instruct the judge to weigh
only the prosecution evidence264 and to disregard all evidence to
the contrary.265 As a result, the prosecution has a credible ar-
gument that notwithstanding the judicial noticeability of the
tests' nonspecificity, the trial judge should disregard this infor-
2 See notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.
11 See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
26, See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
16 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 127, at § 330.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 829 (1971); Sanders v. United States, 416 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 952 (1970). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 307, 319 (1979).
2 See Comment, supra note 139, at 1580.
26 See, e.g., State v. Lassen, 679 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Mandina, 675 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Delaney, 675 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Cooper, 673 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Gonzalez-Gongora, 673 S.W.2d
811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. McMikle, 673 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Nelson, 673 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Anderson, 671 S.W.2d
383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Foster, 665 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Summers, 660 S.W.2d 772,
773 (Mo. Ct..App. 1983); State v. Priest, 660 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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mation when assessing the legal sufficiency of prosecution evi-
dence.
Although superficially appealing, in the final analysis this
argument is flawed. Both precedent and principle support the
conclusion that the judge should consider the nonspecific status
of the tests in ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Some cases go to the extreme of allowing the judge to invoke
judicial notice to disregard facts alleged in pleadings such as
complaints and to dismiss the complaints. 266 At least one court
has reasoned that if the pleading alleges an impossible fact, the
judge should invoke judicial notice to strike the allegation rather
than waste the court's time in litigating impossibilities.1 61 Some
reported decisions also allow the judge to consider judicially
noticeable facts in ruling on motions for summary judgment.26 8
These authorities are certainly apposite to the particular prob-
lem. In disposing of a summary judgment motion, the judge
pagses on the legal sufficiency of the party's evidence and decides
whether there is a triable issue of fact warranting the jury's
time.269 Most significantly, there are state7 ° and federal2 71 cases
directly on point. These authorities apply the so-called "physical
facts" doctrine: In determining whether the proponent has made
out a submissible case, the trial judge disregards testimony that
contradicts the physical laws of nature. 272 The "physical facts"
doctrine involves a species of judicial notice. 273 The judge im-
plicitly notices a particular law of nature such as a proposition
of physics or motion and then effectively excludes contrary live
testimony from the record.274 The "physical facts" cases squarely
See, e.g., Saxton v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 428 F. Supp. 1047 (C.D.
Cal. 1977); Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 87 N.E.2d 30 (II. App. Ct. 1949).
16 See 428 F. Supp. at 1049.
I" See, e.g., Grason Elec. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D.
Cal. 1983).
2" FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
10 See cases collected in Hoffman, The Probative Force of "Physical Facts" in
Missouri Jurisprudence, 47 Mo. L. Rnv. 369 (1982).
21 See, e.g., Daddi v. United Overseas Export Lines, Inc., "Oriental Inventor,"
674 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1982).
"2 See generally Hoffman, supra note 270.
271 Id. at 382-83, 391.
", Id. at 392-94. "Testimony is a nullity ... when it asserts a proposition of fact
contradicting that required by the application of a judicially known relational principle
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support the conclusion that the trial judge should consider ju-
dicially noticeable propositions when ruling on the legal suffi-
ciency of the proponent's evidence.
The rationale of judicial notice points to the same conclu-
sion. The judicial notice and initial burden doctrines share the
common purpose of regulating the rationality of the trier of
fact's findings. 275 One of the most fundamental purposes of the
initial burden concept is to promote more accurate and rational
.verdicts.276 The judge's rulings enforcing the burden help to
ensure that the jury deliberates within a realistic matrix.277 These
rulings preempt the jury's consideration of factual issues when
the proponent's foundational evidence is so flimsy that no ra-
tional trier would infer the fact's existence from the evidence.
In a sense, judicial notice is the other bracket for jury decision-
making. It is as irrational for a jury to disregard an indisputable
truth as it is for the jury to accept a proposition which no
reasonable person would deem proven. At different extremes,
the two doctrines set the outer limits for jury deliberations. 278
The initial burden doctrine identifies propositions that the jury
should not consider because the supporting evidence is so flimsy.
Judicial notice identifies propositions that the jury must consider
because the supporting evidence is so overwhelming and realist-
ically indisputable. In short, if the defense establishes through
judicial notice that all the prosecution's drug identification tests
are nonspecific, the judge should factor that fact into his or her
ruling on the legal sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.279
to another proposition of fact established in the case." Id. at 392. "Courts typically
call the function a 'principle of science,' a 'law of nature,' a matter of 'common
knowledge,' or some variation or combination of these." (footnotes omitted). Id. at
393-94.
2 See C. McCoRMuIcK, supra note 127, at §§ 328, 336.
276 See Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Con-
stitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv. L. REv. 321, 341 (1980).
277 Id. at 348-49.
27 See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To Tm LAw oF EvIDENcE 363 (1978).
29 In some jurisdictions in criminal cases, jury instructions on judicially noticed
facts are couched in permissive rather than mandatory terms. See, e.g., FRE 201(g). It
might be argued that the judge should consider judicially noticeable facts when ruling
on the evidence's legal sufficiency only in jurisdictions in which the instruction would
be mandatory. However, this argument overlooks the reasoning behind the permissive
wording of FRE 201(g). The Supreme Court's original draft of FRE 201(g) contained
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C. When the Defense Establishes Through Judicial Notice that
All of the Prosecution's Drug Identification Tests Are
Nonspecific, the Prosecution's Drug Identification Evidence is
Legally Insufficient Unless the Prosecution Presents Proof of
the Substance's Identity in Addition to the Analyst's Conclusory
Assertion that the Tests Identify the Drug.
Assume this scenario: On direct examination, the prosecu-
tion's drug identification witness testifies that she subjected the
suspected drug to color and ultraviolet tests and that based on
those test results, her opinion is that the substance is cocaine,
as alleged in the indictment. Before Jackson, such testimony
often was found to be legally sufficient to meet the prosecution's
initial burden of going forward.20 However, after Jackson, it is
submitted that such testimony falls short of meeting the prose-
cution's initial burden when the defense establishes the nonspe-
cificity of both tests.
There are various ways of formulating the Jackson test. 28'
One possible formulation states that the evidence is sufficient if
a rational juror282 or any2 3 rational juror could find the existence
of all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. An alternative
phrasing states that the evidence is insufficient if no rational
mandatory wording. See FRE 201(g) advisory committee note. The House Judiciary
Committee amended the draft rule to make the wording permissive. Id. The stated
justification for so doing was that a mandatory instruction against the defendant would
be "contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.. . ." Id. Thus,
the rule's present wording preserves the jury's ability to effectively nullify the law and
facts and return an irrational acquittal. See Note, Maryland Jury as "Judges of Law":
Stevenson v. State, 3 D-r. C.L. REv. 873 (1981); Comment, Courts: Jury Nullification-
The Unrecognized Right, 13 WAsHnuiu L.J. 129 (1974). It would be a misreading of
the rule's legislative history to conclude that the rule prevents the judge from considering
indisputable, judicially noticeable facts when ruling on a defendant's motion for a
directed verdict. The rule's permissive wording was intended to protect the defendant,
and it would be wrongminded to invoke the rule to the defendant's detriment.
m See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
28, 2 C. WiuoH, supra note 149, § 467, at 660.
m See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1983); Turner v. McKaskle,
721 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1983);
Reese v. Bara, 479 F. Supp. 651, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
n' See United States v. Becker, 720 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel.
Newell v. Mizell, 667 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 868 (1982); Robinson
v. Smith, 530 F. Supp. 1386 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
at 319.
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juror could find the existence of all the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 4 A final, functionally equivalent formulation
is the most useful for our inquiry: The evidence is insufficient
if any hypothetical, rational juror285 would necessarily8 6 have a
lingering, reasonable doubt about any element of the offense.2
In the foregoing scenario, the prosecution's evidence is prob-
ably strong enough to create a permissive inference that the drug
is cocaine. Although both tests are nonspecific, 288 the techniques
are fact-finding tools for identifying drugs, and both tests yielded
a result indicative of cocaine. Consequently, a rational juror
could conceivably infer that it is more likely than not that the
drug is cocaine. Both test results are consistent with such an
inference, and there is no test result requiring a contrary infer-
ence. Hence, this testimony would have satisfied the "substantial
evidence" rule which was widely used prior to Jackson .289 How-
ever, it is well settled that a mere permissive inference is insuf-
ficient to satisfy Jackson.290 A rational juror might find, on the
basis of the evidence, that a particular fact is probable and yet
be unable to conclude, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the
fact exists. 291
In the above scenario, a reasonable doubt remains as to the
key issue-the accuracy of the identification of the unknown
substance. While the witness has given conclusory testimony that
the two tests identify the substance as cocaine, judicially notice-
See Loveday v. Davis, 559 F. Supp. 811, 813 (E.D. Tenn. 1981), aff'd, 697
F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1983); Neumann v. People, 526 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Comment, supra note 139, at 1579.
21 See Comment, supra note 155, at 807. See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
at 324.
443 U.S. at 318 n.11.
See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Gonzalez, 617 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980); United States v.
Nazien, 504 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); United States
v. Ellis, 493 F. Supp. 1092 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 617 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); See also Circuit Note, supra note 133, at 429.
2 See notes 72-78, 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
z See notes 160-73 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982); Wheat v. State,
666 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Comment, supra note 155, at 806.
"' See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 150, at 29 ("It [the court] should determine whether
the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the alleged fact was ... in criminal
cases, almost certain.").
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able facts would give any rational juror good grounds for ques-
tioning the testimony. This constitutes reasonable doubt. In some
cases analyzing the propriety of jury instructions explaining rea-
sonable doubt, courts have required a reasonable doubt to be
substantial. 292 Here, the judicially noticeable facts raise substan-
tial doubts regarding two interrelated issues-the analyst's con-
clusions about the identity of the substance and the existence of
an essential element of the offense.
Moreover, the same body of case law indicates that a doubt
can be reasonable and preclude conviction even if the jurors
cannot specifically identify293 or articulate 94 the doubt. In other
words, it is error to instruct the jury that they can acquit only
if they can verbalize their nagging doubt about the prosecution's
case. 295 In the above scenario, the doubt is not only identifiable
and articulable, it is also obvious and inescapable. If the pros-
ecution were able to prove, whether by scientific literature or
experiment, that only cocaine causes a positive identification
under both tests, the combination of tests would be specific for
cocaine. Otherwise, upon learning of the tests' nonspecificity,
any fair,296 impartial, 297 and reasonable298 juror naturally would
wonder whether there was further evidence of the drug's identity,
and that juror would entertain a reasonable doubt upon discov-
ering that there was no other evidence of the drug's identity.
Unless Jackson is to be rendered nugatory, courts would be
Many jurisdictons apply a test even more favorable to the defense in holding
that it is error to instruct the jury that the doubt must be substantial. See, e.g., United
States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974); United
States v. Cotten, 28 CiA. L. REP. (BNA) 2570 (C.M.A. 1981) (Court of Military
Appeals asserted that federal courts have almost universally condemned instructions
equating reasonable and substantial doubt.). In these jurisdictions, even an insubstantial
doubt can mandate an acquittal.
"I See People v. Garcia, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 911 (1976).
" Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
See, e.g., id. at 23.
See United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1058 (1976); In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1975); Van Duyse v. Israel, 486 F.
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
See State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1978).
See United States v. Strong, 702 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bell,
678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356 (1983); United States v. Smith, 631
F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
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compelled to find, as a matter of law, that this scenario neces-
sarily produces reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
There are encouraging signs that the courts may take a fresh
look at the issue of the legal sufficiency of prosecution drug
identification evidence. As noted earlier, use of the new immu-
noassay drug tests will give the courts an opportunity to revisit
this issue.299 Thus far, courts have adopted a stance of healthy
skepticism about the specificity of immunoassay. 300 Moreover,
in a New Mexico case, Chouinard v. State,301 the court acknowl-
edged Jackson as the standard for evaluating the legal sufficiency
of drug identification. Although the prosecution in Chouinard
had presented some expert testimony identifying a substance as
cocaine, the court held that the evidence was not the sort of
"definitive chemical analysis" that Jackson contemplates. 0 2
Decisions like Chouinard may lead to a general reappraisal
of the sufficiency of prosecution drug identification evidence.
The thesis of this Article is that reappraisal is necessary for
situations in which the prosecution chooses to rely solely on
nonspecific drug identification tests and in which the defense
has established the nonspecificity of the tests through judicial
notice. It is submitted that Jackson has raised the threshold for
legal sufficiency to a level that such conclusory evidence no
longer passes muster.
Urging that the threshold be raised even higher, some com-
29 See notes 30-40 supra and accompanying text.
300 Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Kane v. Fair, 33 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2492 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1983) (EMIT test must be confirmed by an
alternative method of analysis); Isaacks v. State, 646 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(standing alone, hearsay testimony of EMIT test results insufficient to revoke probation).
-' 635 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 634 P.2d 680
(N.M. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930 (1982).
31 635 P.2d at 992. But see Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1984) ("more
likely than not" standard sufficient for EMIT test showing narcotics in urine). Also, in
Higgs v. Wilson, No. 83-0256-P (W.D. Ky. July 30, 1984), federal Magistrate W. David
King recommended the issuance of a preliminary injunction against prison disciplinary
actions based solely on Syva EMIT tests. Reliability of Urinalysis in Prison Questioned,
THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 1984, at 12 (THE ADVOCATE is a bi-monthly publication of the
Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy.).
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mentators have proposed that the courts require a positive sci-
entific identification of suspected drugs through the use of truly
specific techniques such as gas chromatography/mass spectro-
metry and infrared spectrophotometry.30 3 However, this proposal
confuses the concepts of scientific certainty and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Trial courts face tremendous difficulties in
attempting to reconstruct historical facts.304 The standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was formulated with those
practical difficulties in mind. 305 Courts must often make prudent
judgments on serious matters even though they have only incom-
plete, fragmentary data. While a scientist can frequently afford
the luxury of experimenting until all doubt has been removed,
courts do not have that luxury. Even in criminal cases, courts
cannot realistically demand the elimination of all doubt.306 Thus,
the proposed requirement for truly specific tests seems excessive.
However, demanding less than the standard recommended in
this Article would be both unnecessary and irresponsible. Setting
a lower standard is unnecessary because even under the inter-
pretation of Jackson urged in this Article, the prosecution has
numerous methods available to satisfy its initial burden. First,
the prosecution's best tactic would be to present evidence of a
specific test such as infrared spectrophotometry or gas chroma-
tography/mass spectrometry.30 7 Second, the prosecution's analyst
could concede that some of the tests used were nonspecific,
identify the other substances that can yield false positive results,
and use exclusionary tests to demonstrate that the unknown
1' See, e.g., Stein & Laessig, supra note 12, at 786.
-1 See S. Saltzburg, Discovery: Criminal and Civil: Scientific Evidence 16-18 (Oct.
19, 1983) (background paper for American Association for the Advancement of Science
Workshop on Scientific Evidence, Washington, D.C.).
-0 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 127, at § 341.
30 See id.
"I See Bleser & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 6. These specific tests are more
readily available than ever before. Recent advances in GC/MS technology have reduced
the cost of the instrumentation and permit less highly trained technicians to conduct the
tests. Some GC instruments now in use can be retrofitted with a GC/MS at a modest
cost. Until recently, infrared spectroscopy could be used only on large samples. See
Midkiff, Washington & Kopec, Diamond and Sapphire Cell Infrared Spectroscopy-A
Powerful New Tool in the Forensic Laboratory, 7 J. POL. SCL & AD. 426 (1979).
However, researchers have perfected new modifications, diamond and sapphire cell
infrared spectroscopy, that allow the analysis of much smaller samples. Id.
1984-85]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 73
seized from the defendant is not one of those substances. 30 3
Third, the prosecution could demonstrate that although the tests
used could have resulted in false positives, the other substances
that could have produced positive results were inaccessible to
the defendant-for example, substances found only in research
laboratories.3°9 Finally, the prosecution always has the option of
eliciting testimony describing experiments designed to verify the
hypothesis that a particular combination of nonspecific tests
leads to a reliable identification of a specific drug.310 The pros-
ecution's analyst does not need personal knowledge of the ex-
periments; it is satisfactory if the experiments are documented
in scientific texts or journals. 31'
The prosecution has many options, and the defense faces a
difficult task in persuading the court that there has been a
Jackson violation.3 1 2 As a practical matter, even if the courts
rigorously enforce Jackson in the manner urged in this Article,
there will be few reversals. 31 3
0 See E. IMWINIELRIED, supra note 47, at § 12-5(C).
3 See United States v. Arias, 639 F.2d 1183, 1185 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).
310 For example, experiments have been conducted to demonstrate that a combi-
nation of morphological and Duquesnois-Levine tests can identify marijuana in solid
form, see Bailey, The Value of the Duquesnois Test for Cannabis - A Survey, 24 J.
FOR. Sci. 817 (1979); Nakamura & Thornton, The Forensic Identification of Marijuana:
Some Questions and Answers, 1 J. PoL. Sci. & AD. 102 (1973), and that immunoassay
and gas chromatography in conjunction are capable of detecting a marijuana metabolite
in urinalysis. See Polzinetti, Sedgwiak & Spiehler, RIA Cross-Reactivity Studies of Roche
Abuscreen Kits, in PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 57; Kogan, Alrazi, Pierson & Willson,
Confirmation of Syva EMIT Roche Abuscreen Urine Immunoassay Results by GCIMS
and Qualitative TLC, in PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 114; Whiting & Manders, Confir-
mation of a Tetrahydrocannabinol Metabolite in Urine by Gas Chromatography, 6 J.
ANAL. Tox. 49 (1982). The military has used GC/MS, a specific technique, to confirm
findings based on a combination of test results from RIA and GC: "[A]t Fort Meade,
the GC/MS retest of 816 samples confirmed the presence of THC in 812 of the samples
identified by RIA-GC. At the Naval Drug Screening Laboratory in San Diego, the figure
was equally impressive: 99.7%." PANEL OF ARMY AND CrVIAN EXPERTS IN TOxicoLOGY
AND DRUG TESTING LEGAL IssuEs, REvIEw OF URINALYsIs DRUG TESTING PROGRAM 19
(Imwinkelried's legal addendum) (1983). But see Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D.
1984); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
3" See United States v. Ortiz, 610 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
930 (1980); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1563-64 (N.D. Ill.
1983). See also FRE 703.
"' Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178
(1984); United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1684, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984).
"I See United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972). See study cited in
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It is not only unnecessary for the courts to continue to accept
conclusory drug identifications based on nonspecific tests, it is
also unwise for them to do so. The essence of the scientific
method is formulating hypotheses and conducting experiments
to verify or disprove the hypotheses. 31 4 A proposition does not
become a scientific fact merely because someone with impressive
academic credentials asserts it as fact.31 5 Testimony should not
be treated as an expert, scientific opinion without a truly scien-
tific basis, such as experimentation. 31 6 Conclusory drug identifi-
cation testimony is antithetical and offensive to the scientific
tradition, and courts should not allow ipse dixit to masquerade
as scientific testimony.
Perhaps it would be convenient to look the other way and
pretend that Jackson does not require a reexamination of the
case law on the legal sufficiency of drug identification evidence.
It may seem expedient to maintain the view that so long as the
prosecution analyst asserts that the tests used identify the drug,
the testimony is legally sufficient. 3 7 After all, why reopen Pan-
dora's box? However, at this point, the necessity for reexamining
the issue should be evident. Jackson is grounded on the due
process clause '18 and, thus, creates a constitutional imperative
for a reexamination. It would eviscerate the Jackson standard
to sustain a conclusory drug identification in the teeth of the
judicially noticeable fact that every test used to identify the
substance is nonspecific. 3 9 Even more importantly, sustaining
such drug identifications places a judicial imprimatur on testi-
mony that cannot justifiably be labeled scientific. The rejection
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 329 n.1 (1979).
1" See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 47, § 4-4, at 123; E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF
PHYSiCAL ScimNcas 38 (1969).
" E. IMWRFULRIED, supra note 47, § 4-4, at 123.
3,6 Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J.
833, 891 (1982).
31, See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
,, See 443 U.S. at 317.
"' A recent Supreme Court decision, California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528
(1984) suggests that the Court may be ready to examine the application of Jackson to
scientific evidence. In Trombetta, a unanimous court declared in dictum that if breath-
alyzer devices were "prone to erroneous readings, then [breathalyzer] results without
more might be insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 2534
n.10 (citing Jackson v. Virginia).
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of such identifications is necessitated not only by due process
but also by the simple demands of intellectual honesty. After
Jackson, sustaining conclusory, nonspecific drug identification
evidence is both bad science and bad law.
